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MARRIACE  BARS:  DISCRIMINATION  ACAINST 
MARRIED WOMEN  WORKERS,  1920's to 1950's 
ABSTRACT 
Modern  personnel  practices,  social consensus,  and the Depression  acted 
in concert to delay the  emergence  of married  women in the American 
economy  through an institution known  as the "marriage bar."  Marriage 
bars  were policies  adopted by  firms  and  local  school  boards,  from 
about  the early 1900's to 1950, to fire single women  when  they married 
and not to hire  married  women.  I explore  their  determinants  using 
firm-level  data from 1931  and 1940 and find they are associated  with 
promotion  from  within,  tenure-based  salaries,  and  other  modern 
personnel practices.  The  marriage bar,  which had at  its  height 
affected 751  of all  local  school  boards  and more  than  50%  of all 
office workers,  was virtually  abandoned  in the  1950's when the cost 
of limiting  labor  supply greatly  increased, 
Claudia Coldin 
Department  of Economics 
University  of Pennsylvania 
3718 Locust  Walk 
Philadelphia,  PA  19104-6297 The labor force participation  rate of  married white  women  increased twenty- 
fold  over the past  century.'  The expansion was concentrated  almost  entirely in 
the post-World  War II period  and appeared  in two phases.  The initial increase 
extended  from  the 1940's to the 1960's and affected  older married  women  more  than 
it  did  younger women,  Employment  among married  women  45 to  54  years  old  expanded 
four-fold  from 1940 to 1960, while  that  for women 25 to 34  years  old rose  by 
less than  half  that  figure.  The second phase  began in  the 1960's, and  its impact 
was just  the reverse.  Younger married  women, particularly  those  with  pre-school 
children,  experienced  greater increases  in  participation  than  did older  women. 
The increase  from  1960 to 1980  was 52  greater for the younger  than the older 
group. 
Many  have  traced  the increase in  female participation  rates since the late 
1940's  to the rise  in real wages  (Mincer, 1962;  Smith  and Ward,  1984,  1985). 
Others have  attributed  the difference between  the older  and young groups to  the 
baby-boom  of the post-war  period  (Easterlin,  1978, 1980).  Younger  women  were 
marrying  earlier and having  larger  families, and thus could not partake equally 
in the general  increase in  employment rates.  But the reason  older married women 
responded  after World  War II as never  before to economic  factors has remained 
somewhat of a mystery. 
Their  heightened  reaction  was  due,  in  part,  to the better  education  and 
training they  received  when young compared  with that acquired  by most  previous 
cohorts  (Goldin,  1983).  It has  also been asserted  that  World War II altered 
gender  relations  and norms that had previously  circumscribed  women's  roles, 
although  many revisionist  histories  have  not  supported  this claim.  The  war 
itself, according  to several recent studies, had little direct impact on  women's 
labor force participation  (e.g., Campbell,  1984). 
-1- But  many  of the forces  that eventually generated  change in  married women'a 
employment 
-  -  increaaed  education,  a  markedly  reduced hirrh rate,  and the 
amergence of  the clerical aector, to mention a few -- were  apparent  as early  aa 
the 1920'a,  Yet the proceaa of  change in  participation  and  in  gender  differences 
in  earnings and  occupations was extremely protrscted.  Conditions  in  the 1930's 
had much to do with the slow progress  in the economic  role  of women,  hut the 
impact  of  the  Depression  often worked through  preexisting  social norms  and 
institutional barriers,  Before  1950 the labor market  did little  to accommodate 
aarried  and older  women,  and many employers barred  their hire.  Married  women 
were  barred  from  the position  of  reacher by the majority  of  local  school boards 
and from  clerical  work  by many large firms. 
The notion  that change in  the female  labor force was  impeded prior  to the 
1950's is often  inferred  from  the slow  growth  in participation  rates of  married 
women  before  World  War II and  from  the rhetoric of Depression  employment  policy. 
Many other  factors,  however,  could have intermediated.  The education,  first 
occupation,  and fertility  of a cohort  influence  the  participation  of married 
women,  and  these  cohorts-effects  are  maintained throughout the  lifetime. 
Differences in  cohort  effects, therefore, could account for  the timing of  change. 
A pooled  analysis  of  time-series  and cohort data  indicates  that  cohort  effects 
as well  as  period  effects, such  as  unemployment,  demand  for  female  labor, female 
wages,  and so on, account for a  substantial  share of  the change in  psrticiparoin 
over time and  across cohorts (see Goldin, 1983; also Goldin, forthcoming, chapter 
5).  But the residuals  from this model  are negative  and large  among older  age 
groups in  1920, 1930, and  1940.  Although  the model  explains much  of  the variance 
in participation  rates  across  cohorts  and through  time,  it is less  able to 
explsin why  participation  rates among older married  women  were low in  the pre- 
-2- 1950 period.2 
Thus older  married  women  before  1950 had lower  participation  rates  given 
all the other factors considered  in  the analysis.  Why they did is explored  here 
in an  analysis  of  'marriage bars,"  prohibitions  against  the hiring of married 
women.  I  discuss how modern  personnel  practices,  social  consensus,  the Great 
Depression,  and individual expectations  acted in  concert  to delay  the emergence 
of married  women in  the American  economy. 
1.0 Marriage Bara 
Discrimination  against  women  is manifested  in a variety of  ways.  In its 
most  typical  form no prescribed  barriers exist.  Rather,  employers,  employees, 
and customers  can express  their prejudices  against women  workers by preferring 
not to associate  with  them.  This form  of  discrimination  is  often inferred  from 
its  effects  on  earnings  and occupations.  In other instances,  custom and 
tradition are dominant  and individuals are penalized  for deviating.  Prescribed 
barriers  against the training  and employment of  women  are  perhaps the  most  easily 
observed forms of  discrimination.  Rules have existed barring  the education  and 
training of  women, as in  the professions of law and  medicine  and among  certain 
medieval  guilds and more  modern  unions  (see Morello,  1986  on law; Harris,  1978 
on the professions  in general).  In other  circumstances,  rules  restrict  the 
employment of  women, as in  the armed  forces, post  office, local fire departments, 
and legal profession.  The distinction between  the two types  of  discrimination 
--  the  more or less subtle  revealing  of preferences  and the  rather obvious 
prohibitions 
- - is often blurred  when written  rules  do not exist  but custom 
dictates the result. 
Bars concerning  the hiring  and firing  of married women,  termed  "marriage bars,"  arose  in taacbing  and clerical  work from the late  1800's  to the early 
1900's and provide  the most  numerically  important  form  of all prohibitions  in 
their Impacr cn  tha employment  of  married women.  In  1920 just  11% of  all married 
women in tha lahor force were teachers and clerical  workers,  yet by 1970  the 
percentage  nearly  quadrupled  to 411.  The prohibitions  covered, therefore, what 
ware to becoaa  the most  frequent occupations for  married  women  in  the post-  1950 
era,  In  contrast,  prohibitthns  against the training and  employment  of  women  as 
doctors  and law'yera,  oroba'oly  the beat  knon  of all bans,  affected  a trivial 
percentage  of women,3  It  ia also of interest  that  marriage bars covering 
clerical  and other  orcupaticns  have existed  arroaa a variety  of countries  and 
have only recently  been prohibited  in Japan by  its  1985 Equal Employment 
Opportunity  Law,4 
Prohibitions  against  the employment  of married women consisted  generally 
of two bans -. one  against the hiring  of  married women  and a second concerning 
the  retention  of existing  workers  when they married.  The first ban will be 
referred  to aa the  "hire  bar" and the  aecond  as the  "retain  bar."  It was 
uncommon for  a firm to hire married  womeo  yet fire  single  women when they 
married,  But firma often banned  the hiring  of  married  women  yet  retained  single 
employees  when  they  married.  When  firms can  acreen  beginners  for  valued  traits 
or when firms  invest considerably  in training  their workers,  firing existing 
workers  can be costly.  Some firms and many school boards allowed  women  who 
married  in  service to remain as temporary workers or  as substitute  teachers, who 
could be dismissed  at will and whose salaries were  not based  on  tenure.  Firms 
often  imposed both the retain  bar and the hire  bar.  It  was rare, however,  for 
a firm  to impose  the same prohibitions  on men) 
The bar against women  who married  in  service was the more restrictive  of 
-4- the two.  In  the 1920's, young  women  were  just  beginning  to extend  their working 
time after marriage.  At that time  the older married woman  seeking white-collar 
employment  was in an extreme minority,  in part  because  increased  education  and 
decreased  fertility most  affected  cohorts born  after  1900. 
The  rationale  for the marriage  bars  offered here  and elsewhere  (Cohn, 1985, 
1988) is simply that  the policy  was profitable, even  in  the absence of what  may 
be termed  clearly  prejudicial  views  about  the  impropriety  of married  women's 
emp1oyment  Even  though  firms lost  many  trained employees  and  restricted  their 
labor supply  by refusing  to hire  married women, they  gained  considerably  more. 
Precisely  why  they gained is  not  yet  perfectly  clear,  and  I  offer  two 
complementary reasons that  place considerable blame on  modern  personnel practices 
such as  fixed salary scales  and  internal  promotion.  But  the marriage bar 
policies  also required  certain precedents,  such  as sex segregated  occupations 
and social  consensus. 
Discrimination  against married  women and older workers  came rather  cheaply 
to firms in the pre-Worid  War II period;  the reduction  in supply was small  and 
the loss in  training  was  minimized  by  the types of  occupations  routinely offered 
women.  Firma  also perceived  there  were gains  to policies that  guaranteed 
homogeneity  across sex, race, age, and  marital status lines within  occupations. 
But  many  aspects of  this equilibrium were  deceptively  fragile and  were  to  change 
radically during  and after World  War II. 
By  the 1950's firms could no  longer ignore older, married  women  and  certain 
aspects  of the work place  were altered.  The marriage  bar,  which had at its 
height  affected  75Z of  all local school  boards  and  more than 50% of  all office 
workers,  was virtually  abandoned  in  the 1950's.  The rhetoric of  the work  place 
changed  as well.  Where  a married  woman was once  an  anomaly,  perceived  as an 
-5-- inefficient  workec,  she  was  now the  coveted employee.  In mid-l950's  one 
personnel  director, whose  firm  had  previously barred  married women, praised  older 
women's  "maturity and  steadiness," and  another noted  "they are more  reliable  than 
the younger  ones."6 
1.1 Extent  of the Marriage  Bar 
The  extent  of the bans across  the entire  economy  has been difficult  to 
assess.  These were, after  all, the policies of  individual  firms and, in  the caae 
of school  boards,  individual  localities,  Prohibitions  against  the employment 
of married women teachers have been lass difficult to track due to comprehensive 
surveys  of  local  school  boards  by  the  National  Education  Association  (NEA) 
beginning  in the late 1920's. 
Marriage  bars were instituted in public school teaching  sometime in the late 
l800'a and  were  expanded  in  the early 1900's.  Extensive  surveys of  local school 
boards  beginning  with  1928 indicate that  61% of  all school boards  would  not hire 
a married woman teacher  and  52%  would  not  retain any who  married while on 
contract  (see Table I).  Because the data  are prouped in  the NEA reports by size 
of  locality, Ta'ole I  also  weights the percentagaa by  population.  T'ne unweighted 
data are generslly  greater  than the weighted data because  large  citiea  had 
proportionately  fewer bars.  Both  types of  bars increased during  the Depression, 
and  on  the eve of  American  entry into  World War II fully 87% of  all school boards 
would not hire a married  women and  70% would not  retain  a single  women who 
married.  But sometime during  World  War II both  bars  disappeared.  By 1951  only 
18% of  the school boards  had the hire  bar and 10% the retain  bar. 
The  extent  of  the  marriage  bar  in office work can  be  inferred from 
information  in  two comprehensive  surveys conducted by the Women's  Bureau  (U.S. 
-6- Department  of  Labor,  1934, 1942), called  here the 1931 Office  Firm  Survey  and 
the 1940  Office  Firm  Survey  (see Data  Appendix).  Firm-level  manuscripts  from 
these  surveys  reveal  much about  the  origin of  the  hans and  their  impact 
Although  both  Women's Bureau  surveys were  administered in  the 1930's the earlier 
one,  taken  in 1931, contains  information  about  the 1920's,  and the later  one, 
taken  in  1940,  reveals the changes  that  occurred  during  the Depression.7  The 
earlier  survey,  therefore,  will be a guide  to  whether  the bars existed before 
the rationing of jobs  during  the Depression. 
The  1931  survey  sampled  mainly  large  firms  in seven  cities  of which  178 
firms in  Chicago,  New  York  City,  Philadelphia,  and Hartford  are included  here. 
The 1940 survey was taken in  five  cities  end  sampled a  wider  range of  firma;  the 
sample  here  includes  328 firma  in  Kansas  City,  Loa Angeles,  and Philadelphia. 
Only Philadelphia  is included  in both surveys.  The firma  in the 1931  survey 
include  insurance  companies,  investment  houses,  banks,  publishing firms, 
advertising  companies, public  utilities,  and mail  order firms.  Added  to  the 1940 
survey are  manufacturing  firma,  retail  stores,  wholesale  outlets,  small 
professional  offices, and  firma in  the transportation and  communications  sector.8 
Both surveys contain information of a  rather  confidential  nature  regarding 
firm  personnel  practices,  including occupations  offered to  either women  or  men, 
discrimination  against blacks  and  Jews, the retention of  single women  when they 
martied,  the barring  of  married  women,  the use of salary  scales, promotion  from 
within,  and minimum and maximum age limits.  Information of this type would  be 
virtually  impossible  to obtain  in  today's litigious environment,  But  peraonnel 
officers  and  other  firm  managers interviewed  by  the  Women'a  Bureau were 
exceptionally  candid,  ma their  remarks below  will indicate.  The surveys also 
contain  more  mundane  personnel  mattara,  such  as  the numbers of female and male 
-7- employees, number  of  new employees, hours of  work, personnel benefits  (retirement 
plan,  group  insurence),  union activity,  the bureaucratic  organization  of the 
firm, and  various paternalistic practices  Because the two surveys were  executed 
by the same governmental  agency (the Women's  Bureau  of the U.S.  Department  of 
Labor)  they  are  similar  in  format,  although  that  for  1940  is  more 
comprehensive. 
10 
In  1931 12% of  all firms in  the sample had  s formal  policy  of  not retaining 
single  women when they married  (see Table  1), but 23% of  all female  employees 
were in  firma having  such a policy.  The policy, therefore,  increased  with  firm 
size,  Some  firms  did  not  have  a  strict marriage  bar  policy,  but  had 
discretionary  rules allowing  them to retain  able workers  to  hire  married  women 
when single were unavsilable,  or to leave  the policy  up to department  heads. 
These  are termed  the 'discretionary"  cases in  the table.  About 35% of  all  female 
employees were  working in  firms thst  would  not retain  them when they  married  as 
a condition of  both  policy and  discretion.  Considerably more  firms had  policies 
against  hiring  married  women than  against  the  retention  of single  women who 
married.11  About 29% of  all firms had such  policies  in the 1931 survey  and the 
policies affected  36% of  all female  employees across  these firms.  More  than  50% 
of  all firms  in the sample  dismissed women  when they  married as a condition  of 
policy and discretion,  and the policy affected  more than  50%  of all  female 
employees  in  the sample.'2 
The policy  of  firing and hiring  married  women  varies  considerably with the 
type of firm  and  with firm  size  (see Table  2).  Insurance  offices,  publishing 
firms,  banks,  and public  utilities  had the most extensive  controls in 1931; 
insurance  offices,  banks,  public  utilities,  and  the  office  portion of 
manufacturing  firms had the most in  1940.  Large  firms, measured  by the number 
-8- of  female employees, were  more  likely  to institute such  policies  than  were  small 
firms for both  years'3  Although  the marriage  bar  policy  varied  considerably  by 
city in the 1940 sample,  it did not in the 1931 sample,  given  the  industrial 
distribution. 
Tables  1 and 2 suggest  an  increase  in the marriage  bar policy  during  the 
Great Depression.  The data  in  Table  2 that  array policies  by size of firm  show 
some increase  during  the 1930's, particularly  for the marriage  bar as  policy. 
The Kansas City  and  Philadelphia percentages  for the retain  and hire  bars  in  1940 
are, with one exception,  greater than the average for 1931, but the Los Angeles 
data are not.14  The extent  and even  existence  of the increase  is difficult  to 
discern  because  the 1931 survey  includes only large  firms, and the industrial 
distribution  of firms  as well as the  cities  covered  differs  across the  two 
surveys. 
One way of handling  the problem  of composition  is to  pool the two samples 
and include firm size,  industry and city dummy variables,  and a year  variable 
to estimate  the impact of the Depression.  Equations  estimated  in this  fashion 
exhibit a positive,  large, and significant  effect of  the Depression, in  the case 
of the hire  and the retain bar as policy.  But the discretionary-policy  version 
of both  the hire  and retain bars  did not change  over time.15 The Depression,  it 
seems,  led firms  to extend  a discretionary  marriage  bar into  the realm of firm 
policy.  Where firms had  exercised discretion  in  the hiring  and firing  of  married 
women  before  the Depression  and during  its first year,  they instituted  strict 
policy  not to hire and not to retain married  women  by 1940. 
Philadelphia  was the only city  sampled in both  years  and  provides  further 
evidence  for the extension  of the marriage  bar during  the Depression.  Of the 
41  firms in  the 1931  sample for Philadelphia, 23  were  also sampled by  the Women's 
-9- Bureau  in the  1940 survey.  Of these  23 firms,  11 experienced  no change in 
policy,  2 reversed  their  prohibition,  and  fully  10,  or 43%,  increased  their 
prohibitions 
Marriage bars  have been  mistakenly  portrayed as  originating  in  the 
unemployment  of the 1930's, hut the Depression  reinforced  and extended  already 
existing bans  agsinst the employment  of  married  women.17  Because the respondents 
in the 1931 survey often  noted that the policy  was  a Depression  measure,  and 
because  the data  were  coded  aotordingly,  the results indicate  that the marriage 
bar, in both  the retsin  arid hire  versions,  predsted  the Depression  among  firms 
hiitng  office  workers,  The  precise  degree  that it did,  however,  cannot  be 
aacercained with these date.  There  is,  however, ample  evidence  in  Table  1 that 
marriage bare instituted  by school boards preceded  the Depression  and that the 
bars  in  both  sectors were  expanded  during  the 1930's.  T'ne  extensions,  however, 
often cook the  form of  governmental  regulations  that  greatly strengthened 
preexisting  social  norms  and conventions. 
Federal  Order  213, passed in 1932 as part of the Federal. Economy  Act, 
mandated  that executive  branch  officials,  in the face of  layoffs,  fire  workers 
whose spouses were employed by the federal government.  The regulation  almost 
always  entailed  the firing  of  married women, although  many  husbands  could  have 
been furloughed.  By  1940 26 states had  proposed legislation to  restrict  married 
women's  employment  in state government  jobs,  and 9  others  had some  form of 
restriction  already  in place (Shalleross,  1940).  Similar  regulations  became 
effective  among  various local  governments  and served to expand  the  group  of 
affected  occupations  to include librarians  and nurses,  although  they  too were 
probably  covered  by  prohibitions  prior to  the Depression.18 
Federal  Order 213  and the  actions  of state  and local  governments  lent credibility  to pre-Depression  policies of  businesses  and  local school boards  and 
enabled  the extension  of a system  already in place.  The bar was extended  to 
occupations and to sectors,  such  as manufacturing,  where  it  was not extensively 
found before  the Depression.  The Depression  served  to reinforce  social  norms 
that  kept  married  women,  particularly the emerging  middle  class, out of  the labor 
force.  Because  the bars  were  extended  during  the Depression,  and because  they 
were  often  justified by the need  to  ration  employment  among the most  needy, many 
have thought marriage bars  originated  in  the Depression.  But it is inconceivable 
that marriage bars  could  have  gained  such  wide  acceptance  during  the Depression 
had  previous policies not existed and had  social consensus not  been  built around 
them 
Economic  recessions  are often  periods  of social  recession,  when already 
discarded  and outmoded forms  of  gender  relations  are  extolled.  It was no 
accident,  for  example,  that  differences  in wages  between men and women for 
similar  work were scrutinized  in a federal  survey taken  in 1895/96  (U.s. 
Commissioner  of Labor,  1897) to  establish  that  women  were  not taking  jobs  from 
men.  The  report  was  ordered  by  Congress  during a severe depression  when 
unemployment  rates in  the manufacturing  sector were, for a  brief period, as high 
as  they were  to  be  again in  the 1930's.  similarly, periods of  economic  expansion 
often  provide an  impetus for progressive  social change, as  happened  in  the 1950's 
when  the marriage  bars  vanished. 
1.2 Firm-level  Evidence,  1931 and 1940 
The correlates  of the policy  of not retaining single  women  at the time  of 
marriage (Retain) are explored  in  Table 3.  A  somewhat different set of  variables 
could be included  for the more  comprehensive  survey  of  1940.  In both  1931 and 
-11- 1940, there is a  positive. yet  weak, relationship between  the  number  of  employees 
in  the firm  and  the probability of  not retaining women  who  marry  (also see Table 
2 on  the effeot  of firm  size).  But in both samples,  the impact  of firm size 
declines  when factors  concerning  personnel  relations  are  included.  Size,  it 
seems,  may be a proxy here for the  internal  structure  of firms  and related 
employee  policies.  Firms having  a policy  of internal promotion,  fixed  salary 
scales, or  regular salary increments with  time on  the job (Promote) had  a  higher 
probability  of not retaining  single women  upon  marriage.  The probability  also 
increases  with policies  that set a maximum  age  for new hires (Maximum  age). 
Fitas  generally  adopted a maximum  age  policy when  they  instituted  regular 
internal promotion  ladders, and the policy  was generslly  in  effect  for both  men 
and women,  The  retain  bar policy increases  with the  existence  of pensions 
(Pensions),  yet decreases  with unionization  for the  1940 sample  (Union).  The 
lower the number  of  scheduled hours per week (Hours) and the smaller the growth 
rate  of  the firm  for the 1940 sample (Growth) the greater the probability  of  not 
retaining  single  women. 
- 
Another variable  related to  internal promotion  was the existence of certain 
jobs for which  only  men  would  be considered  (Male only), and that  variable,  as 
well,  is positively  associated  with the  retain  bar policy.  Although  some of 
these jobs  were  supervisory and  others were  professional,  the vast  majority  were 
starting  jobs,  such as messenger,  mail boy,  and file clerk.  The greater  the 
number  of these,  the more  extensive  the internal promotion  in  the firm.'9 
The  results  indicate  that fins with established  personnel  practices 
regarding  internal promotion  and salary increments  did  not  retain  single  female 
employees  when they married.  Their  policies,  however,  were tempered  by the 
tightness  of their  labor market,  so that fins with lower hours,  possibly  due to work-sharing  policies,  and lower  growth  rates were  more likely  to have the 
marriage  bar.2° 
The coefficients  on most  variables  are sufficiently  large  to have greatly 
influenced  the marriage bar  policy.  In  the 1931 data,  for example,  a firm  with 
300 employees and  a  work  week  of  40  hours would  stand a  nearly  negligible  chance, 
3.5%,  of having  the retain  bat as policy.  But had the  firm,  in addition,  a 
policy  of  internal promotion  the probability would  rise to  14.9%.  If  hours  fell 
from  40 to 35, say  because of  depressed  economic conditions,  the probability  of 
the retain  bar would rise further to  29.3%.  In  the 1940  data, the same  original 
firm, however, would  have  a 154%  probability  of the retain  bar, increasing  to 
24.7% with  a  policy  of  internal promotion,  and to 43.4% with a decrease  in hours 
to 35 from  the original 40.  Thus the 1940 firma had a much  higher  chance,  from 
1.5 to 4 times in these examples, of  having  the  marriage  bar  independent of  their 
personnel  practices  and  hours.  Further,  the impact of  the Promote variable  is 
less in the 1940  data  than  the 1931 data.  The implied change  in  the probability 
of  the retain  bar  with the internal promotion policy  is 0.168 for 1931  but 0.076 
for the 1940,  computed around  the means.2' 
All of hs  implies that  during  the Depression  firma  joined  a band-wagon 
that had sanctioned  tt.e firing  of  women who  married  and their wholesale  banning 
as  employees.  Some  firma in  the Depression  enacted the bar for reasons similar 
to  those  of  firms  in  the  1920's,  but  many  others,  particularly in  the 
manufacturing  sector, were  seeking ways to cope with  employment  cutbacks.  They 
found  precedent  and consensus  in  discrimination  against married  women. 
The presence  of  the maximum  age policy  raises  further questions  about the 
hiring  of  women.  In  some instances  the policy  was related to the existence  of 
pensions or  group insurance that  were  not  experience-rated,  and  maximum  age rules 
-13- shielded  the firm  from  paying  out  more  to employees  then  had  been  accumulated,22 
The policy  constreined  borh  men and women  searching  for jobs in  their mid-life, 
but provided  greater  restrictions  for women  who lacked  continuity  in the work 
force.  For men, the new  personnel  practices  often meant that  tenure with  firms 
was encouraged  and frequently  ensured.  But  for women,  the new institutional 
arrangements  became  added bars to  their reentry  at  mid-life, 
The Women'  s Bureau  schedules contain, in  addition to  the easily  quantifiable 
information just  analyzed, comments of  personnel directors and agents of  the firm 
revealing  their justificationa  for marriage  bar policies.  The reasons elicited 
for the marriage  bars  often  confound the firms' actual  constraints,  individual 
prethdices,  and societal  norms.  Some firms  expressed  concern  that women  who 
married in  their employ  might  become  lesa efficient because  they would  leave in 
the near  future.  A  personnel officer in  a  Philadelphia  insurance firm  noted  that 
although his  firm  had  no  official policy, he  would  prefer  women leave  on  marriage 
because  "they were less efficient after  marriage  -- too  much temporary  didn't 
care attitude,"23  Other agents, concerned  that by firing women  who  married  they 
would lose  valued  employees, put them  on  probation.  A  Philadelphia bank  official 
stated  "that  those who marry  are  told that the company  reservea  the  right  to 
dismiss  them  at any time so that those whose  work deteriorates  after  marriage 
can be dispensed  with."24  Some  firms  actually reversed  earlier  bars,  like 
Provident Mutual  Life  Tnsurance of  Philadelphia which  had  a  bar in  1924 but found 
that  "too many valuable  [employees] were  lost."22 
Most officers,  however,  gave  no rationale  for their  policies,  and a few 
offered personal  reasons.  An  agent  in  the publishing  industry noted  that "men 
are too selfish  and should have to  support their  wives,"  and another,  employed 
by  the  Presbyterian  Board  of Christian  Education,  thought  "personally  that 
-14- married  women  should  plan to be in their homes  if  possible."26  Many personnel 
officers and other  agents appeared  to take great pride in answering  that their 
firms gave  preference  to  married men in hiring  and in  salaries,  and to married 
women whose  husbands  were  unemployable.  After all,  social  consensus  in the 
1930's labor market  was built around  rationing jobs  by  need, the notion  that men 
should earn a "family  wage,"  and norms  circumscribing  the  economic role  of 
married  women. 
One surprising aspect of  the comments is that  various firms did  mention  they 
gave  small  dowries or vacations  when female  employees  married,  but these were 
always  firms  that retained single women  and hired married women,  In  Hartford, 
where most insurance companies had  both  the hire  and  retain  bars,  Phoenix Mutual 
Life,  which  had no policy, had a "special wedding  vacation.  ,,27  An investment 
firm  in  Chicago,  which  also did not have the marriage bar,  stated  they "really 
encourage marriage  by  giving a present from  the company. 
28  does  not appear, 
then,  that  firms  encouraged  young women  to marry,  in the  same manner that 
pensions  encourage  retirement. 
Marriage  bars therefore were instituted  by large  firms, with centralized 
hiring promot4.n  fccin thin,  salary  schedules that were  often fixed  and  based 
on tenure with the fita, and other  modern  employment  practices.  The evidence 
suggests that  firms may  have wanted  to  encourage turnover when  earnings  rose  more 
rapidly  with tenure than  productivity.  The experience  of local  school boards 
with  the marriage  bar  echoes  that of  firms hiring  clerical workers,  although the 
evidence  is at a more  aggregated  level. 
-15- 1.3 Complementary  Evidence  fcom  Local School  Boards 
Sometime  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  school  boards  instituted 
contractual  obligationa  with teachers  and fixed  salary  schedules.  The stated 
purpose  of  salary schedules was to elicit  appropriate effort  from  teachers with 
a  minimum  of bickering.  Although the precise  timing  is not clear,  bars against 
the hiring and retention of married women appear linked to these arrangementa.29 
Salary  schedulea  varied  widely across  the  thousands  of American school 
boards  by the stipulation  of minimum  and maximum  salaries  salary  increaenta, 
and thus the number  of  years of  poasible  increase,  Salary  schedules,  therefore, 
did  o,ot cisc  limitlessly.  By  1923 the vast  msjority of  school boards  had adopted 
a salary  schedule,  and the average elementary-school  teacher would  hsve taken 
6 to 2 years to achieve maximum  salary.3°  The schedules were  further complicated 
by provisions  for increases with training  and summer  school and for off-scale 
increments  called  supermaximum  salaries. 
As in  the case of  office workers,  the policy  of marriage  bars  was pursued 
more  vigorously  when  the potential  labor supply of  already married  women  seemed 
slender  and  when  general  economic  conditions  called for  reductions  in 
personnel.31  It should  also  be noted  that the legalityc  f the marriage  bar  was 
often in  doubt,  and  in  1941  courts  in  22  states  ruled  tha  marriage bar 
"capricious  and unjust."32 
The firing of married  school  teachers  was justified  by contemporaries  in 
various  ways.  There  was a reason  to fit anyone's prejudice,  ranging  from  the 
moralistic  -  -  that  married  women  with children  should  be home taking  care of 
their own -- to the Victorian  -- that  pregnant women  would  be  objectionable  in 
the classroom  -- to  the economic  -- that married women  were less efficient  and 
became  entrenched.33  As in the case of office  workers,  the marriage  bar for 
-16- teachers was successful because most  Americans  could  justify  and  rationalize  it. 
Thus  the evidence from  local school  boards  and firms hiring  office workers 
suggests  that marriage  bars are associated  with fixed  salary  scales,  internal 
promotion,  and other  personnel  policies,  and that  they  flourished  when the 
potential  sacrifice  from  limiting labor  supply is  minimal.  The  bars, 
interestingly,  were  rarely  found among firms hiring  factory operatives  for whom 
piece-rate  payment was  often used (47Z of all female  operatives  fn the 1890's 
were  on  incentive pay)  and for whom, therefore, the relationship between  earnings 
and  productivity  was strictly maintained.  The only important exception  I have 
encountered  is that of electrical  machinery  operatives  (Schatz,  1983)  in two 
large  manufacturing  firms  (General  Electric  and  Westinghouse)  both having 
extensive,  modern  personnel  practices  similar  to those  in office  work.34  The 
sectoral  distribution  of the marriage  bar creates  a prima facie  case  that it 
emerged when the relationship between  pay and productivity  was severed.  There 
were few costs,  and much to gain,  from both forms  of the marriage  bar in the 
1920's, and  the possible  benefit grew  during  the Depression.  But  increased costs 
were lurking In  the background. 
1.4 Explaining  the Marriage  Bar 
Social  consensus  has so often been  built around barring  the employment  of 
married  women  that the original reason  for the marriage bar  has been obscured. 
A  frequently  encountered  interpretation  of  these  prohibitions  involves 
discrimination  against educated, middle-class  married  women, particularly  native- 
born and white  women (see,  for example,  Kessler-Harris,  1982).  The  covered 
occupations,  teaching and  clerical  work,  almost always  required  high-school 
-17- education,  and thus  many have claimed  the  hans were intended to limit  the 
employment  of educated,  middle-class  married  women.  Female operatives in 
manufacturing,  waitresses,  and domestic servants, on  the other hand, were  often 
foreign horn  and black, and their positions were  generally unaffected  by  marriage 
bans,  To this way of  thinking, the bans  served  tc maintain  a threatened  status 
quo, keeping middle-class  women  in  the home  to take  care  of  their families.  Yne 
bans,  in  this  light, were a reaffirmation  of a legal and social  system  marred 
hy patriarchy. 
The personal  prejudices  of employers,  as  expressed  in the  1940 survey, 
indicate that certsin firms may have  passed  the matrisge bsr policy  to limit the 
employment  of middle-class  women,  But  the  correlation  cf  the  policy with 
vsriables  concerning personnel policiee indicates that, while  personal  prejudice 
may have  been satisfied,  other considerations  were  paramount. 
Another  explanation  of bans is that  employers  in firms  with rigid  wage 
systems, tied to their workers'  seniority,  desired a young,  inexperienced  work 
forte, particularly  in  times of  unemployment.  When  managers  are unable  to  set 
wage  stales for separate jobs, as might be  tb-c case when  there is o strong  union, 
certain  positions  could have  earnings  that rise more  rapidly  then- productivity. 
At some point,  therefore,  earnings  for certain  individuals  will exceed their 
productivity,  and the firm  will wsnt to terminate  their  employment.  Routine 
clerical  work  in  large-stale  firms provides a possible  instance in  which  the job 
was  simple,  repetitive,  and not  accompanied  by  m  continued  increase  in 
productivity  with experience  on the  job.  The  marriage  bar was  a socially 
acceptable  way of  terminating  the employment  of young  women  whose  wages  would 
eventually  exceed  their addition  firm  revenue. 
The position  that  labor  turnover was desired  has been  convincingly  argued elsewhere  for the case  of two British  firms,  the Great Western  Railway and the 
General  Post Office,  (Cohn, l985).  Because  salary  schedules  in  these  firms 
rose with  tenure presumebly  more  then  did  productivity,  some  experienced  workers 
eventually  beceme too  expensive  end cheeper  beginners  were preferred.  For 
reasons that  will  become  clear, it  wee  women,  not men, whom  these  firms desired 
to dismiss.  Firms  found  it edventegeous  to pay workers  lees then their worth 
at  the beginning  of  their  employment, but more  leter on,  At some point, eey in 
5  yeere,  the (present discounted)  velue of the peyment  scheme would  just  equal 
one  in  which  the  employee were peid her true  value to the firm et eech  date. 
At 5 years,  then, both firm  end employee  would  be even.  The purpose  of such 
salary  schedules  is often  to reduce  monitoring  end supervisory  costs.  But if 
workers do not leave the firm  at  the "breek-even" point, eey at  5-years, the firm 
can lose money  each day the worker  remains.  Of course,  if the worker  leaves 
before  the breakeven point,  the worker  will  have bet, end it is this espect 
of  the  scheme  that keepa  workers  in  line.  Rather than have systematic 
supervision,  a policy of eporedic  monitoring  with dismiseel  of unproductive 
workers will  be more  effective  the heevier  is the penelty.  Under  the system  of 
paying  wnrkers lees at  the outset end  more lacer, workers are, in  essence, bonded 
to the  firm,  and firing  compels  them  to forfeit the bond. 
Cohn's reasoning is  similer thet of  Lesser  (1979, 1981) concerning  mendetory 
retirement end  hours  reetrictione.  But in  the case of msrriege  bers firms went 
to dismiss workers at  s rather early point in  their employment.  Most  young  women 
were  hired  at around  16 to 18 years  end  most  married in  their  early  twenties. 
Firms,  therefore,  could  treat a 5 to  7 year  period  me the expected  tenure  for 
young  women,  since  most  would leave at merriege  in any case.  The office  jobs 
assigned  to women  did not entail  much productivity  increese  over  time  end,  in 
-19- contrast  to  thsir male counterparts,  few  would  receive promotions  from  within. 
Thus  the marriage bar  ensured  that all  women left after  a relstively  short 
period  and that  the  firm  would not have to support  high-priced  experienced 
workers at  the expense of  cheap beginners.  Becsuse the marriage  bar did  not set 
a specific age or time period, young women could evade "early retirement" through 
late marriage.  Substantial dowries,  according  to  Cohn,  were  therefore offered 
to  women who  married after at least 6  years of company  service.  The dowries 
were meant  to  ancoursge young  women  to  marry and thus leave the firm, in  the face 
of their rising reel wages but constant productivity 
While  various  facts  in  the  American  case  acer  onsistent  with  this 
explanation  for the marriage hers, others are not.  Marriage bars, it was  found, 
are associated with  fixed salary  scales, internal promotion,  and other personnel 
practices  and they are not associated  with  piece-rate  work,  Severiog a strict 
relationship  between  productivity  and earnings  is related,  in some manner,  to 
the institution  of  marriage  bars.  These  facts lend  support  to the notion  that 
turnover was desired  for the reasons just  outlined. 
But firms did not seem  to  care if  single worsen  remained  indefinitely  with 
the firm.  It was marriage,  not age nor experience,  that  mattered,36  They  were 
also less  concerned  about  retaining  women who  married  in service  than shout 
hiring  married women.  Among ffrms that  had some  form  of the bar in the 1931 
sample 49% had the hire  bar but not the retain  bar, and thus would  not hire a 
married  women  but would retain  a single women  who married.37  Barriers  to the 
hiring  of married  women can not be attributed  to a simple  desire  to increase 
turnower.  Rather,  auth  barriers can  be viewed  as reflecting  various  prejudices 
concerning  married  women's  employment.  Firma  may have believed that married 
women  were less productive  in  general, but that single women  could  be screened 
-20- on  the job before marriage.  Thus  it appears that  many  firms did  not  want  to lose 
skilled  and trusted employees.  In  fact, the sectors with the most restrictive 
policies, often  had female employees with  the longest tenure.  Further evidence 
against  the turnover  thesis  is that  American  firms with  dowry  arrangements  did 
not  institute  marriage  bars,  contrary  to the British  experience  described  by 
Cohn. 
Of most significance,  the  salaries  of ordinary female  clerical  workers 
(e.g.  ,  typists,  stenographers>  rose by  only  1.44% annually  with  tenure (see Table 
4),39  Thus  the  difference  between  productivity  and earnings  could  have been 
increasing  at a maximum  of only 1.44%.  The 1.44%  figure is a maximum  because 
part of it may reflect  true  productivity  increases.  Further,  fixed  salary 
scales, often written  into  labor contracts and found in  personnel  brochures,  did 
not rise continuously  with time and became  level at  about  6 years  for  women. 
If the marriage bar were intended to get rid of workers  at, say, 5 years 
tenure, then the break-even  point between a flat  profile and one that rises at 
1,44% must  be 5 years.  Beyond  that point, earnings rise  at 1.44% more  than  does 
productivity  to the  firm,  assuming  the worker's  value to the  firm does  not 
increase.  At b years  of service,  then, the employee's  cost to the firm  would 
exceed  her  value  by about  3% and at  10 years the figure would be  about 11%, both 
computed  under  the assumption  that her value  to the firm does not increase at 
all.4°  Although  it is possible  that  the difference  was sufficient  to make the 
marriage  bar policy  profitable,  the slow  growth  in  earnings  with tenure  casts 
some doubt  on  the thesis.  There  is, however,  a related possibility. 
Employers  may have perceived  that recently  married  female  employees  had 
reduced productivity  but found  it costly  to supervise,  fire,  and reduce  wages 
on a discretionary  basis.  The majority  of  young women in the 1920's  left the 
-21- work force at  the precise rime of  msrriage  or soon  theresfter, more  than  80% did 
by  estimates  presented elsewhere  (Coldin,  forthcoming,  chapter  2).  Firma, 
therefore  may have  been reluctant  to retain  recently  married women  who would 
troat  their  jobs as temporary  poaitions,  be less docile,  and less willing  to 
remain  in  the dead-end  positiona all were aaaigned.  Rather, they  may  have  found 
it  more profitable  to have  rules  governing the hiring  and retention  of  married 
women.  The reason  that  rules,  rather than  discretion,  were preferred  concerns 
a set of  related  polities  instituted by  various  firma  in  the  1920's.  roe 
policies  include  rigid  salary  aoalea,  strict  internal promotion  lines,  and 
paternalism.  Thus rho rationale here is related  to that of Cohn  The personnel 
polities  and  salary  structures  of  certain  firma  caused  rules  rather  than 
discretion  to be  most  profitable. 
Firms  often  adopt  internal  promotion,  fixed salary stales,  and benefit 
packages  to conserve  on  supervision  costs  and encourage  efficiency  and effort 
among  employees  (see,  for  example,  Lazesr,  1979;  Lazear  and Rosen,  1981). 
Discretionary  firing could result  in  greater wage  demands to compensate employees 
for the increased  probability  cf  being  terminated.  In  various  incentive-based 
models of  the  labor  market (lszear,  1981,  1979;  Bulow and Summers,  1986) 
employees  base their salary  demands  on  the  expected probability  of  being 
furloughed.  The gains from  having  rules rather  than  discretion  increase if  the 
reduction  in labor  supply  from  curtailing  the  employment  of married  women is 
smell. 
Therefore,  the bar against retaining  single women  at  marriage  emerged,  in 
pert, from  the various policies of  modern  personnel departments.  These  policies 
mmdc discretionary  firing  costly, end resulted  in salary  scales end promotion 
procedures  that severed the relationship between  wages  end  productivity. 
-22- Two complementary reasons have  been  offered for the  benefits  of  the  marriage 
bar to firms:  one  involves  a  reduction  in the  costs  of paying experienced 
employees  and the other a lowering  of  the cost  to  firing workers.  But firms also 
incurred losses from  the bar.  Trained  and trusted employees had  to  be fired and 
no matried woman  could be  hired.  Marriage  bats  were  adopted  in  the 1920's and 
1930's  because  these coats were low,  They  were minimized  by certain  features 
of  the labor market.  The cost  of  firing  women  who  married  in service was slight 
because  the ancillary rule,  the barring  of  all married  women,  entailed,  at the 
time, little  sacrifice.  Costa were  further minimized by  the type of  occupations 
routinely  offered women,  Elsewhere  I have discussed  how increased  education 
encouraged  extensive division  of labor in  the office and  fostered  mechanization, 
both of  which  increased  the value  of  formal  skills and  reduced the need  for on- 
the-job training  (Coldin, forthcoming, chapter 4),  Experienced female  workers, 
in the majority of  offices, were  easily  replaced by  female high  school graduates. 
Jobs  in  the clerical  sector were  highly  segregated  by  sex -- men were routinely 
barred  from  some  occupations, women  from  others.  Firms, therefore,  did  not lose 
much  by having  policies  that required them  to  diamiaa women  when they  married. 
With little ro  lose  and much to  gain,  a substantial  percentage of  firms 
instituted  a marriage bar prior  to the Depression  and  many extended  the bar as 
a socially  acceptable  means  of  rationing  employment  during  the 1930'a. 
1.5 The Decline of  the Marriage  Bar in the 195D'a 
The 1950's mark a sharp break in the way the  labor  market  accommodated 
married  women,  older  women,  and  women  with  household reaponaibilitiea. 
Discrimination  never disappeared  and child-care  centers never  flourished.  But 
after 1950  the  marriage  bar vaniahed almost  entirely (except  for  flight 
-23- attendants41) and  parttime work  becarne widespread.  The factors that  account for 
these  changes  acount  to nothing  short  of a revolution  in the demographics  of 
labor supply.42 
Three-quarters  of  all female workers in 1900, and  more  than  one-half  in  the 
(non-war)  years  prior  to  1950,  were single.  Not  surprisingly,  they  were 
exceptionally  young.  The  mean  age of  single women  workers was 20  years  in  1900, 
and  that  of  all working  women was 23  years; but by  1950 the mean  for all exceeded 
36  years.  Employers in  the 1920's and  l930'e routinely hired only  inexperienced 
high  school  girls;  "younger,  untrained  people  direct from [h.igh3  achool prove 
note  aariafectory"  was the frequent response of  personnel  officers.43  They  had 
little reason  to look elsewhere,  Young,  single women  flooded the labor marker 
in these years;  they were docile, educated, and had few  home  responsibilities. 
The labor  market  for women  workers was  organized for the young and  was structured 
around  the presumption  that women  would remain  at work  only  until  marriage. 
Demographic  shifts  of the 1920's  and 1930's  made  many  changes  inevitable. 
The decline  in  the birth rate,  evident n  Figure  5.3, meant the population  had 
to  age substantially  in  the coming years and that the supply of young  women  and 
female high school  graduates had to  decline as a proportion  of  the population. 
This "labor  squeeze"  was  further  exacerbated  by several  related  changes  -- 
increased  education,  the post-World  War  II  decline in  the marriage  age, and  the 
baby  boom.44  Thus fewer young woman  ware  available for  employment  after the late 
1940's, and those who might have bean  ware  marrying  earlier and having larger 
families.  For all  these  reasons  the  supply of young,  single  female workers 
simply disappeared.  The data in  Table  5 tell much  of  the story. 
The percentage  of the adult  female population  composed  of 16 to 24 years 
olds was 31%  in  1900 but 20% in  1960.  The percentage  of adult women  who were 
-24- 16 to 24 and sng1e was 21%  in 1900 but 11%  in 1960,  and the  proportional 
decreaae  ia even  greater for those  18 to 24 years.  The proportion  of 16 to  21 
year  olda at  school  was  1.7 times as great  in  1960  than in 1900.  The largest 
change in  Table  5 involves combining  eli.  three factora  age, marital  status, 
and education  --  into a single measure.  the percentage  of  adult women  composed 
of  those 16  to 24  years old, single, and not  at  school,  The  measure s  3.6 times 
as great in  1900 as in 1960.  All three factots point to  a decrease  Ln  the supply 
of  young,  female  emplcyees  over  the first  half  of this century. 
This inversion in labor acpply  was  accompanied by  a desire  by  older, married 
women  to  seek gainful employment.  The young  women of  the 1910's and 1920's who 
left high  school and  took clerical positions eventually became  the older, married 
women of the 1930's  ard 1940's.  Most were past child-rearing  age,  and as a 
cohort they  had  few  children  by hisoricsl co'rperson.  Further, they had  skills 
and work experience  it. the emergIng sectors of the nconomy.  Tn the ebsence  of 
the Depression  they  would  surely have increased their lsbor force pertic.pation 
earlier than  the 1950's, and their partioipation  during  World  War TI  creates  a 
prima  facie  case for that  counterfactuml. 
Thus the constraints  facing  firms changed considerably  with  World  War II. 
No longer  did they operate in an  environment  of  unemployment.  No longer  could 
they  bar the hiring  of  married  women without  plmcing formidable  restrictions  on 
their imbor  supply.  Personnel polities quickly reflected these new  constraints. 
The  procedures  end  the  rhetoric  accompanying  them  mre  revealed  in original 
schedules  of m 1957 study on  personnel  polities  (Hussey, 1958; called  here the 
1957 Hussey  Report, see Data Appendix). 
Older  female workers in the  mid-1950's  were suddenly  praised  for  their 
maturity,  relimbility.  neat sppemrmnce,  and less  chatty  nature.  Employers, 
-25- particularly  in the clerical  sector, were pleased  to "rehire  those who 
previously  sened in that capacity,"  as did Penn  Mutual  Life Insurance  which 
prior  to World  War II had a marriage bar.  Scott Paper hired  married women  who 
r.ould  "offer skills gained  earlier, before  marriage,"  underscoring  the finding 
that  a  women's first occupation  altered her  chance  of  future employment  (Goldin, 
1989.  forthtomingL4  But  in  retail  trades, particularly  in the suburbs,  the 
older  married  women with absolutely  no previous  training  wee now rhe  "ideal 
employee";  the middle-class  woman,  "naturally  courteous"  and "well-bred,"  who 
did not have to work  was preferred by the major  department  storee.4 
Not all personnel- officers viewed the hiring of the older married woman with 
equanimity.  There were  detractions aa we-Il ma  benefits.  In retail trade, one 
manager  remarked that "Housewives who  h.ave never worked  or have  not worked  for 
15 to 20  years are found  to be inexperienced  in  arithmetic  and  have  difficulty 
in  learning  to operate the cash  registers."  In  banking,  "older women  may work 
more slowly," but most  added as well that "the type  of aervice they can give a 
company  is of great  value. " Firms  were still  leery  of hiring  young married 
women and acme adopted  a policy  of  not hirin.g  those with  small children or  firing 
women  wh-o became  pregnant.  The sequel to the marriage  bar was the "pregnancy 
bar."  All  in all,  the beat female  employee  was,  in the words of a  Sears, 
Roebuck,  and Co. officer,  "a  married woman  with a mortgage  on  her  house  and  her 
children  partially  raised. 
By  the 1950's married  women were welcomed  employees  in  almost  all large, 
paternalistic  companies  that just  prior to  World  War II  barred  their hire.  The 
complete turnaround  was a consequence of  changed  constraints,  The unemployment 
of  the 1930's,  that compelled  firms to ration  jobs  through means  that  included 
the firing  of  married women, had  vanished  and  in  its place was an  extremely  tight 
-26- labor marker.  The young  woman of two decadea  earlier who gave a firm several 
years  before  marriage,  waa replaced  by one who left  school  later  and married 
eanier.  Firm aanagera  knew the  constraints,  although  they often overstated 
thea:  "In the earlier years,  the girl of  18 might work  until  she aarried  at 23 
or 24  a she is more  likely to  marry  within  6 aonths or  a year  of  starting 
work and resign  within  another.  But  it should  also Dc remembered  that the 
older  married  woman  of the 1950's Lad been the young  woman of the  920's and 
1930's.  The point  dId nor escape me  attention  of firm  officers  it  the Hussey 
Report  who spoke  of womer  returning  to positiona  they held decades  before. 
Despite their rusty matheaatcal skills, older  married  women  of the 1950's were 
considerably  more equipped  to handle  modern  clerical  and sales  work than  were 
their predecessors  in  the 1920's. 
Altered  constraints were  not the only facrora that brought  a shift in  hiring 
practices.  World  War fl awakened firms to  the fac" that bans  against  the hiring 
of married  women  were  lessening  their  supply of  female  employees  The number 
of working  women  during  World War II increased most among  those older than 45 
years.  From March 1940  to July 1944,  the peek of the wartime  employment  of 
woaen,  those 45 to 64  years old increased  in  numbers by 165  and those  over  64 
years by 197Z;  in contrast,  those 25 to 44  years  old increased by only  128Z. 
The bans  had little  impact on  potential  labor  supply in the early 1920's 
when  the majority  of  older married women  would  not have joined  the labor force 
in any  event,  But  the  bans  became  considerably  more binding and thus  more 
restrictive  as tohorts of  educated young  women advanced  in  age.  By  the 1940's 
many  in  the cohorts who served as  office workers when  young were the mothers of 
grown  children,  and by the 1950's the vast majority  of adult married women  had 
high  school diplomas.  It  had  been  easy  in  the 1920's for firms to  issue blanket 
-27 policies against  the hiring  of  married woman, but it  was far harder  in the 1950's 
for them to bar certain kinds  of married  women  -- those with young  children, 
those with demanding  husbands,  and so  on.  So the bans  were lifted,  almost  in 
their  entirety,  and the participation  of married  women in the American  labor 
force advanced  in the abser.ce  of perhaps  the most  blatant form of eaployment 
discrimination  in  the history  of  women's  work. 
1,6 The Long-Run  impact of the Marriage Bar 
The bans restricted  the participation  of married  women in the  American 
economy in  several senses,  In  the most  obvious fashion they  barred  married  women 
from employment  in a varfety of occupations  during the  first  half of this 
century  But the marriage bars  that preceded  the Great  Depression  may  have  been 
less overtly and intentionally  discriminatory  than is apparent.  Marriage  bars 
constituted an  odd form  of  discrimination  against women.  The covered occupations 
were  almost  always  female-intensive  ones,  so it cannot  be said  that  women  aa a 
group were  discriminated  against,  Social  consensus was formed  around  and fueled 
the rules, hut t.he  dominant underlying  racionele was not necessarily  a pcejudice 
against middle-class  married women's  working. 
As characterized  here and in the work of Cohn (1985, 1988)  the bars were 
initially  related  to the  adoption  of tenure-based  salary  scales  and related 
personnel  policies.  But they  may also have  resulted from  perceived  differences 
in  the efficiency  of  single and  married  female employees,  and such  beliefs  may 
not have  been  formulated  in  an  unbiased  fashion.  Dscriminatinn  against married 
women  may have  caused  employers  to have  a  jaundiced view of  their productivity. 
Both  reasons offered  here  for the marriage  bars  are  based  on  the fact  that  firm 
policies  segregated  office work by sex and routinely  placed  women in dead-end positions.  But even  had marriage bars  been  motivated entirely  by  unbiased,  but 
profit-maximizing  employers,  they encouraged  others  to find justificatior  for 
their  prejudices.  Social  norms  against  the employment  of married  women that 
preceded  and fostered  the bans  and the extension  of both the bans and social 
norms  during  the Depression  were  a setback  to -orking women. 
The  immediate  impact  of the bans  in  the  1920's  on  the  labor  force 
participation  of married  women  may not have been substantial,  but the longer 
range  effectc  were ikely of great significance.  Young  women had little 
encouragement  to  invest in  skills that  were  valued  in  the sectors coverer  by the 
bars.  They  might become  typists and possibly  machine  operators  but they  had 
less  incentive  to become accountants.  The bats also prevented  firms  from 
recognizing  the hidden  labor supply of  older marrIed women  As  the bars  expanded 
in the  late  1920's  and  during  the  Depression  many married women who might 
otherwise  have looked  for employment,  were discouraged  from  doing  so,  As the 
potential pool  of  educated  and expertenced married women  expanded, firms  may have 
underestimated  the costs of the marriage bar policy. 
The bars in office work  both before  and during  the Depression  restricted 
the employment  of  married  woman but did  not block  their hiring,  Smaller firms 
without modern  personnel practices  hired  married women and did  not fire single 
women when they married.  Sectors  such as banking,  insurance,  and public 
utilities,  however, were  off limits to  married women, as  were  a large percentage 
of local school  boards around the country.  For offIce workers these prohibitions 
often meant  that married  women  were  restricted  from precisely  those firms having 
internal promotion possibilities.  While internal promotion  was  never substantial 
for women  in  any sector, the added restrictions  lowered married  women's returns 
to  education, 
-29- A  sample of  female  clerical workers from  the  1940 Women's Bureau  survey (the 
1940 Office  Worker  Survey) reveals differences between  married  and  single women's 
earnings, given  years with  the current employer, total job experience, educston, 
and time spent  between  jobs  in  the home, among  other relevant  factors.  Married 
-and single  women earned  approximately  the same on  average,  but the returns  to 
aducaton varied  by  marital status.  Returns were  considerably  lower for married 
women,  so that while  women  with lower  than average  education  received  higher 
aarnings if they  were  married, those with  higher  than  average education  received 
lower earnings.  Returns  to a year  of eduration were  4.6% for single  woaen  but 
only 1%  for married women,50  The data  suggest that married  women  were  rhanneled 
into firms. serrors, and jobs  for which  eduraton was  of  lower value  parrirularly 
within  the internal promotion  scheme. 
The extensive  movement during the  Depression  to ration  jobs by firing 
sarred  women  can be credited  to the marriage  bars that  preceded  1929.  Firma 
rould hardly  have  built  a solid consensus  around  the firing of  married  women  had 
it not been for the existence  of marriage  bars prior  to the Depression.  The 
bars,  through a peculiar quirk of  history,  were  responsible  for the setbarks  to 
women's  employment  during  the Depression.  In these ways,  then, marriage  bars 
served  to delay  the period  of increased  female  labor  force  participation  in 
America 
-30- ENONOTES 
1.  Official  censua  estimates  ftom  "gainful employment"  data are 2.5% fot 1890. 
The most recent  figure  is 558% for 1988, yielding an increase of twenty-fold. 
When the 1890  figure  is revised for the undercount  of married  women  working  at 
paid  employment in the home  and on family  farms the  figure is reduced to  about 
4 to  5  times  (Coldin,  1986a) 
2. The residuala ate large and positive for the younget groups in the moat recent 
decades 
3.  In  1980,  for  example,  only  14% of  all  labor  force  participants  were 
physicians  and lawyers. 
4. Marriage  hats  and other  diactimination  on the basis  of martial  status  are 
discussed  in International  Labor Organization  (1962).  Edwards  (1988) analyzes 
the  impact  of the  Japanese  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Law of 1985.  Many 
Japaneae  firma, which  often have life-time employment  for workers,  fired women 
at the time  of  marriage. 
5. Airlinea  impoaed both  forms of the marriage bar in the 195O'a which  initially 
affected  both male atewarda  and  female  stewardesses.  Cambridge  and Oxford 
Univaraitiea  at  one  time,  mandated that male instructors  be unmarried,  a 
continuation  of  the previoua  clerical  atatua of profeaaora. 
6.  1957 Huaaey  Report:  Penn Mutual  Life Insurance  Co., August  22,  1956: Brown 
Inatrument, March  29, 1957. 
7.  The survey  was taken  in 1931 in the four cities  sampled; other  citiea  were 
surveyed  in 1932. 
8.  Government  offices  were excluded  from the  sample  becauae  they used civil 
service procedures. 
9.  Personnel  officers  and other  agents of the firms freely  admitted  to having 
discriminated  against blacks  in  hiring  office workers and  to  various reasons for 
their prejudices.  Such  candor  is echoed  in  the remarks on aex  discrimination. 
10. The Women's Bureau  also recorded individual-level data  from  personnel  records 
in each  of the firma  surveyed.  These records do not exist for the 1931 survey 
but do for the 1940  one, and  have  been  used in  Goldin  1984,  1986b. 
11. Cross tabulations  of  the hire and retain bar for the two years arc 
1931  1 — bar as policy  or  discretionary  1940 1 — bar as policy  or  discretionary 
Retain  Hire Bar  Retain  Hire  Bar 
Bar  0  1  Bar  0  1 
0  45%  27%  0  44%  23% 
1  3%  25%  1  3%  30% 
-31- 12  These suxsmary data  are in  general agreement with  those from  a  national  survey 
cited  in Cohn (1985, p. 99).  In that sample  51% of all offices  did not hire 
married  women and 30% did  not retain them  in  1936 (when "supervisor's  discretion" 
is treated  as no bsr).  For  factory  employment  the  figures  are  39% and  18%, 
however there  is  little  evidence  that  factories  had as  extensive  bars  for 
operatives  in  the 1920's  as they  did for clerical workers.  Rather,  it  appears 
that operatives  were almost  entirely unaffected  by the marriage  bar until  the 
Depression. 
13.  Because  the  1931  survey  included  only fins that  had  more  than  9  female 
employees, only such firms are included for the 1940 survey information  in Table 
3.  Note  the very small numbers of firms in the  smallest size group for the 1931 
survey and  the substantial  fraction of  total female employees  in  firma with  over 
700. 
14.  roe differences  between  the 1931 and 1940 data  are most apparent  in Table 
I.  Of the 12  possible  cases,  the percentages  are all greater for Philadelphia 
and Kansas  City  in 1940 than  for rhe aggregate  in  1931, with the exception  of 
the unveighted,  hire  (diacretonary  and policy) case for Kansas City in 1940. 
roe 1940 Philadelphia  data  for the weighted,  retsin  (policy and discretionary) 
case  is juar  0.2 percentage points  lower than  that for the aggregate  1911 data. 
It is not deer why Los Angeles  is an  outlier.  It is  possible  that  only large 
cities  in eastern  and midwestern  states had extensive  marriage  bars;  western 
cities  may  have had less  restrictive  policies,  iO general,  against  female 
employment. 
15. The  coefficients  on  the dummy  variable for the 1930's sample  are: 0904 (t — 
1.67)  for the case  of  the retain  bar as  policy  and  0,928  (t  2.20) for the rose 
of the  hire bar  as policy.  An  insurance  company  in Philadelphia  with 300 
employees,  for example, would  have  had a 23,4% probability  of  the retain  bar in 
the 1931 sample, but a 43.0% probability  in  1940. 
16. One firm  actually  changed each  bar in the opposite  direction and is included 
with the group  experiencing  no net change.  Of the 10 that increased  the bar, 
4 changed the retain bar only, 3 changed the hire  bar only, and 3 changed  both. 
The increased bar occurred  in  three ways: S fins moved  from  a  discretionary  bar 
to a bar policy;  2 moved  from  no bar to discretionary;  and 3 moved  from  no bar 
to a bar policy.  Fully  50% of the increase reflects  a change from  discretion 
ro rule, providing further evidence to support the pooled  regreasion results that 
many fins during  the Depression  merely  changed discretionary  policies. 
17.  See the discussion  in  Schsrf  (1980), for example. 
18.  On legislation  passed and proposed  during the Depression  see  Shallrross 
(1940) and Kess1erHarris (1982); a detailed  history of  Federal Order 213 ran 
be  found  in Schsrf  (1980, chap. 3).  See also  Wandersee  (1981) on the impart of 
the marrisge  bar during  the Depression. 
19. A similsr vsriable  for "female only" jobs,  those for which  men  would  not  be 
considered, was not significant  and wss omitted. 
-32 20.  Note that  the  1931 results may reflect  the  decline  in hours during the 
initial  onset of the Great Depression. 
21. The computations  use the logit  regression  coefficients  in Table 3, column 
(1) Retain  Bar "As Policy," for both  years.  To  compute the chance  of  having  the 
retain  bar,  the coefficients  ($)  are multiplied  by their mean values (X),  in 
this case  the 40 or 35 hours  week,  the  300 employees?  and a 0 or I for the 
Promote  variable.  The equation  for the probability  (P) ?  a  logit  estimation 
is: P  l/1  +  exp(-Xflfl.  Th  cosputstons for thn cierge in  thfr  retsln  bar with 
the  adoption  of the  internal promotion  policy  use  the tormuls:  BP/BPromote 
P(l 
-  P)$,  where  is the coefficient on  the Promote vsriable.  The compcted  data 
for 1940 implicitly  apply to either  Philadelphia  or  Kansas Gity  because  of  the 
inclusion  of city  dummy varIables. 
22. This discussion  raises  the possib1ity that retreaent end grtup  £nsurence 
policies  changed between the 1920's and 1950's and  became experience  rated,  If 
they  did, older  comen in particular wou.d  haie  benefited,  The  possfbfllty  tha' 
some personnel  practices  changed  raises  the  issue  whether  tenure-based  wage 
systems snd  promotion  from within  were  also  altered  in  the 1950's  to sccommodste 
the large  supply  of  older female  employees. 
23. 1931  Office  Firm  Survey: Indemnlty Ins. Go.  of  North  America,  Philadelphia. 
24. 1931  Office  Firm  Survey: Provident Trust  Go ,  Philadelphia. 
25. 1931  Office  Firm  Survey: Provident Mutual  Life Insurance,  Philadelphia. 
26.  1931 Office  Firm Survey:  F. A. Davis  Go,;  Presbyterian  Board  of Ghristiar' 
Education,  Phlsde1phie. 
27.  1931  Office  Firm Survey: Phoenix Mutual  Life insursnce, Hartford. 
28.  1931  Office  Firm  Survey: Field Glore and Go., Ghicago. 
29. Peters  (1934,  p. 25),  in a volume  on married  women teachers  in  Virginia, 
contains the  only published  evidence I have encountered  on  the  urban-rural 
breakdown  of  the marriage ban over time.  According  to  his figures,  the majority 
of  urban  school  boards  in  Virginia instituted  a ban against hiring  married women 
before  1928, while the majority of  rural school boards  instituted the ban  at  the 
start of  the Great Depression.  About  one-third of  all urban  school  boards  having 
a ban after  1932  had one before  1918, while  only  one-tenth  of  the rural  school 
boards  had  such  a  ban before 1918.  This  chronology  fits that  of  the institution 
of fixed  salary  scales. 
30. See National  Education  Association  (1923) 
31. Margo and  Rotelle  (1981) consider the case of  Houston,  in  which  the marrisge 
bar was established  before World  War  I,  then  dropped  during  the war, only  to  be 
reinstated  after. 
32.  See  Peterson (1987)  who notes  that n  St.  Louis,  where  the  bar was 
established  in  1897, no women  had challenged  it  until  1941. 
-33- 33.  See Lewis  (1925,  pp.  185-88)  who lists  31 frequently  heard reasons  why 
married  women should not be employed  as teachers and 31  equally  routed  reasons 
why they should. 
34. There are probably  other  exceptions,  particularly  in manufacturing.  Orra 
Langhorne,  for example, in  her 1886  volume  in  Sketches from  Pit inia (cited  n  Scott  1970,  p.  122),  noted  that  "married  women are  not  admitted"  in the 
cigarette  factories  of Lynchburg  in  which white,  single women  snd black  women 
worked. 
35.  See also  Cohn (1988) who analyzes  one of the surveys  used here and finds 
support  for his  theory of "synthetic  turnover."  Although  my findings  differ 
somewhat from Cohn's  on  the  details  of  the  msrriage  bat,  our  substantive 
conclusions  are quite similar. 
36. In  the case of  stewardesses,  however,  it  was often age ss well  as marriage 
that  was cause  for dismissal. 
37.  The  49% figure  includes  firma  with the  bar  as polity and the  bar  as 
discretionary  course,  The figure  is 62% for the bat as policy  only.  In 1940 
the sane percentages  are 42% and 52% respectively. 
38. In New York,  for example,  3fl of all female  office  wotkers had spent  5 or 
more  years with their present  firm; but 44% of  those in insurance companies  and 
38% of those  in public  utilities  had (U.S. Department  of Labor.  1934,  p. 27). 
The evidence  for the other cities supports  the conclusion  here that there  is no 
clear  relationship between experience with  a  firm  and the existence of  a  marriage 
bar. 
39. The 14%  figure  is en  average of the coefficients  on  years  of  current  fita 
experience  for the two lower-skilled  female groups  in Table 4.  The coefficient 
on yeats  of totsi  job  experience  is  larger  in magnitude  (see  Table  4).  but 
presumably  it  is the value of  the individual's  training to  any firm.  The notion 
that fines pay workers  less than they ate worth at the beginning  and more att-he 
end to nonserve on supervisory costs  pertains  to  th-e  difference between true 
productivity and earnings.  Thus,  the coefficient  on years with the current firm. 
also  called  tenure, is the relevant  figure. 
40. Typists  and stenographers  typically  began  work at $70/month  in 1940 (U.S  - 
Department  of  labor,  1942).  If  earnings rise  at  1.4% per yeat  hut  productivity 
does not and if  the break-even  point  i5 5 yeats,  the  (constant)  value of the 
worker  to the firm  is around  $73.  That is,  the present  discounted  value  of  $73 
over  5 yeats  is approximately  equal to  the present discounted  value  of  a stream 
of  earnings  that  begins  at $70 and rises by 1.4% each year for 5 years.  At 10 
years  of service,  for example,  the worker  costs  the firm  around  $80/month  but 
she is still worth  only $73, or 9.6% more than she is actually  worth. 
41. United  Airlines  recently  lost a Title VII class  action  case (Rnmasanta  ti. 
United Air Lines,  Inc.) for firing  stewardesses when they  married. 
42. Oppenheimer  (1970, chap.  5)  contains  such  a theory  about  the evolution  of 
married  women's  labor market  work. 
-34- 43. 1931 Office  Firm  Survey: Hartford  records. 
44. Easterlin  (1978, 1980) causally connects the two swings  in fertility  through 
a model of relative  income. 
45. 1957 Hussey  Report: Penn  Mutual  Life  Insurance, August  22, 1956; Scott Paper, 
March  28, 1957. 
46. 1957 Huasey  Report: Lord  and Taylor, October  30,  1956. 
47,  1957 Hussey  Report:  Strswbridge  and Clotnier,  November  14, 1956  tentral- 
Penn  National  Sank,  October 19, 1956. 
48. 1957 Huasey  Report:  Sears. Roebuck,  end Co.  ,  Noverher 7, 1956. 
49.  1957 Hussey  Report:  Fidelity M.xtual,  August  17. 1956. 
50.  The sample  (1940 Office Worker Survey) is described  in  the Dsce  Appendix  and 
consists of 724 women,  168 of whom  were married.  It is discussed  at length  ir 
Coldin  (1984, 1986b).  In a  regression  on  the log of  full-time yesriy  earnings, 
the coefficient  on  a dummy variable  indicating rnsritsl  status  (1  married)  is 
0.424,  but chat on en  interaction  between the  dummy  variable end years  of 
education  is -0.0362.  The  coefficient  on years of education  for  the entire 
sample  is 0.0458. 
-35- Table  I 
Marriage  Ears Among School  Boards, 1928 to 1951 
and Firms  Hiring  Office Workers,  1931 and 1940 
Do Not Retain  Do Not Hire 
Single Women  When  Married  Married  Women 
Year  Weighted  Not Weighted  Weighted Not Weighted 
Teachers 
1928  47.3%  52.2%  61.9%  61.0% 
1930/31  52.2  62.9  72.2  76.6 
1942  58.4  70.0  77.7  87,0 
1950/51  9.4  10.0  19.5  18.0 
Clerical Workers 
(Policy)  (Policy) 
1931 (178)  25.0%  12.0%  36.0%  29,2% 
Phila,  (44)  26.4  14.3  40.4  31.8 
1940 
Phila.  (106)  26.6  23.6  41,1  50.9 
Kansas  City  (83)  28.4  15.7  41.7  31.3 
Los Angeles  (139)  9.4  8.6  24.4  15.8 
(Policy & Discretionary)  (Policy & Discretionary) 
1931  34.7%  27.3%  51.7%  52,8% 
Philadelphia  36.9  35.7  60.7  59.1 
1940 
Philadelphia  34.5  34.9  58.5  60.4 
Kansas  City  46.0  30.1  57.8  43.4 
Los Angeles  25.1  15.7  38.8  26.6 
Notes: 
Teachers:  Weighted figures  use city population  weights;  the  unweighted  are 
simple  averages  by number  of school hoards,  City  population  weights  are from 
Historical  Statistics  (1975).  The "Do Not Retain"  case  is  (1  -  "may  continue 
to teach");  the "Do Not Hire"  case,  includes "rarely under  special  conditions" 
for 1942 and 1950/51. 
Office Workers:  Weighted  figures are weighted  by  the firm's female  employment; 
the unweighted  are simple  averages across firms  in the sample.  The 1931 sample 
includes  Chicago,  Hartford,  N.Y.C.  ,  and  Philadelphia.  Where  possible  the 
responses  apply  to practices  predating  the Depression,  although  the interviews 
were conducted  in  1931/2.  The 1940 sample  includes Los Angeles,  Kansas  City, 
and Philadelphia  and refers to  practices  during  the Creat Depression.  Figures 
in parentheses  are  the  number  of observations.  "Discretionary"  means  firma 
stated single  women were preferred,  married  women were placed on  special 
probation,  or  the policy  was up to the department  head, 
Sources: 
Teachers: National Education Association  (1928, 1932, 1942, 1952), from  citations 
in  W. Oppenheimer,  The Female  Labor Forc in  the Ungftates  (Westport,  CT: 
Creenwood  Press,  1976; orig. pubi.  1970), table 4.5. 
Office Workers:  1931 Office Firm Survey,  1940  Office Firm Survey,  see  Data 
Appendix. 
-36- Table  2 
Marriage  Bars by Sector  and Size of  Firm.  Clerical  Sector 
Size  of Firm (number of female  clerical employees) 
1931 













Do  Not Do Not  Do  Not  Do  Not  Distributions  by 
Hire  Retain  Hire  Retain  Firms  Female  Employees 
11 -  20  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.11.  0.1% 
21 -  50  25.9  10.9  46.7  21.0  27.5  3.3 
51 -  100  40.4  8.4  63.5  28.9  24.2  6.0 
101  -  200  17.4  3.5  41.8  26.0  18.5  9.4 
201  -  400  31.0  22.2  59 5  47.5  11.8  11.3 
401  -  700  39.0  32.2  89.8  45.7  5.1  8.6 
701+  39.5  30.4  45.6  33.5  11.8  61.3 
No. of  Obs,  178  51597 
1940  (Kansas City  and Philadelphia) 
11  -  20  43.6%  25.6%  24.2%  3.71. 
21  -  50  49.1  25.5  34.2  11.2 
51 -  100  65.6  56.3  19.9  15 7 
101  -  200  75.0  43.8  9.9  13.8 
201  -  400  62.5  62.5  5.0  12.0 
401+  54.5  27.3  6.8  43.6 
No. of  Obs.  161  25358 
Sector: 
1931  Number  of Firms 
Insurance  73.21.  59.5%  58 
Publishing  56.].  36.0  34 
Banking  41.9  30.2  27 
Pub. Util.  93.9  42.9  13 
Investment  26.6  9.8  27 
Advertising  28.2  0.0  13 
1940 (Kansas City and Philadelphia) 
Insurance  50.0%  42.3%  53.8%  53.8%  26 
Publishing  33.3  13.3  46.7  33.3  15 
Banking  54.5  9.1  72.7  45.4  11 
Pub. Util.  50.0  33.3  66.7  50.0  6 
Investment  16.7  16.7  50.0  16.7  6 
Manufact.  57.6  22.0  67.8  37.3  59 
Sales  17.2  10.3  24.].  13.8  29 
Includes only firms with > 9  female  employees  for  comparability  with 1931. 













-37- Table 3 
Explaining Marriage  Bars: 
Logit Regressions  for Retain Bar, 1931 and 1940 
Dependent variable  — 1 if Retain Bar is maintained 
As Policy 









#  employees  x l0 
(# employees  x 10-7)2 
Promote 
Maximum  age 







40  . 2 
(2)  (3) 
0,671  0.186 
(1.33)  (0.41) 
-0.906  -0,58 
(1,06)  (0.70) 
1.49  1.94 
(2,18)  (4.27) 
0,775  0,991 
(1.29)  (2,03) 
132  0.892 
(2.32)  (1.99) 
-0.228  -0.225 
(1.95)  (2.51) 
4.91  6.29 
(1.05)  (1.77) 
-46.6  -78.3 





Log likelihood  ratio  -54.1 
No. of observations  174 
Mean  of the dependent 
variable  (unweighted)  .121  .289 
As Policy 
and Discretionary 








# employees  x 
(#  employees  x 10-5)2 
Promote 
Maximum  age 



































-38- Hours  -0.170  -0.110  -0.093  40.4 
(2.46)  (1.42)  (1.46) 
Growth  -1.93  -2.05  0.162 
(1.20)  (1.61) 
Constant  4.65  2.51  2.67 
(1.68)  (0.78)  (1.01) 
Log likelihood  ratio  -126.7  -99.5  -135.3 
No, of  observations  317  271  271 
Mean of the dependent 
variable  (unweighted)  .151  .151  258 
Notes: 
Promote — I if  policy  of  firm was to promote from  within  or if ther' wsro gradeA 
salary  steps  or annual  increases  in salary; Maximum age  1  if the firm had a 
stated maxirum  age for new hires,  Pensions  I if the firm  had a pension  plsn; 
Union  — I if  the firm's office workers were  unionized; Male  only  I  if the firm 
had at least  one job  for which  women  ware excl'sded  by policy, Pours — norms1 
weekly  hours  of office  workers;  Growth  — (new  hires  in 1939)/(employment  in 
1939)  .  Means  refer  to  the  regression 
ir. the last column  Dummy variables  for 
cities  and a variable indicating  whether salary  grades were used were also 
included  in the  1940  regression.  Absolute  values of  't'  statistics  are  in 
parentheses. 
Sources: See Table  I. 
-39- Table  4 
Earnings  Functions  for Unskilled  and Skilled Office Workers,  1940 
Lower Skilled  Typist Steno  Higher  Skilled 
Dependent variable  Full-time Annual Full-time Annual  Full-time Annual 
(logarithm)  Earnings  Earnings  Earnings 
Males  Females  Females  Males  Females 
Constant  6.17  6.19  6.48  6.50  572 
(69.5)  (52.3)  (69.9)  (58,6)  (34.6) 
Total Experience  0.0461  0.0287  0,0238  0.0056  0,0384 
(10.1)  (3.59)  (4.22)  (6.86)  (4.19) 
Total experience2 x 10-2  -0.0709  -0.0590  -0.0390  -0.0800  -0.0719 
(7.85)  (2,15)  (1.95)  (6.02)  (3.  71) 
Current firm  experience  0.0121  0.0144  0.0134  0.0102  0.0189 
(3.75)  (3.14)  (4.26)  (2.57)  (2.68) 
Years  education  0.0426  0.0347  0.0205  0,0321  0.0640 
(6.39)  (3.85)  (2.97)  (4,87)  (5.52) 
Married  0.083  0.0162  -0.030  0.181  0.134 
(2.34)  (0.41)  (1.14)  (3,94)  (2.38) 
R2  .725  .464  .381  .514  .536 
Number  of  observations  204  187  338  237  121 
Notes and Source: 1940 Office Worker  Surrey.  Full-time  earnings are wages  paid 
per last  time  period  worked  multiplied  by the number  of time  periods per year. 
Total experience — experience with  current firm  + experience at  other office jobs 
+  experience  at  jobs  other  than  offices,  Lower-skilled  occupations  are 
messenger,  mail  boy, various lower-skilled  clerks, mimeo-mschine  operators,  and 
so  on.  The  typist-steno column also includes various machine operators.  Higher- 
skilled include professionals,  supervisors,  those  in the accounting  group,  and 
soon.  The lower-skilled and  higher-skilled  groups were  chosen  for comparability 
between  male  and female office workers; very  few  men in the sample were  typists 
and stenographers.  Absolute  values of 't'-ataristics  are in  parentheses. 
-40- Table  5 
The "Labor Squeeze,"  1900 to  1960 
1900  1920  1940  1950  1960  1900/1960 
Female  Population 
16-24 years/ 
16-64 years  30.9  27.0  29.0  20.9  20.3  1.52. 
18-24 years,  single! 
18-64 years  14.7  12.0  10.9  7.4  6.4  2.30 
16-24 years,  single/ 
16-64 years  20,7  17.0  15.2  10.9  10.8  1.92 
16-24 years,  single, 
not at school/16-64 years  14.9  12.9  9.7  5.8  4.1  3.63 
1960/1900 
16-21 years  in  school/ 
16-21 year  olds  27.5  32.9  34.9  37.8  47.4  1.72 
Notes  and Sources: 
All data  are from  relevant U.S. population  censuses. 
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-44- DATA  APPENDIX 
1931 Office  Firm Survey:  National  Archives,  Record  Group #86  Boxes  280-281. 
See U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Womens Bureau,  "The  Employment  of Women in 
Offices," by  Ethel Erickson, Bulletin of  the Women'a Bureau  No. 120 (Washington, 
D.C.:  G.P.O., 1934).  Only the firm-level  records of this  survey  survive.  The 
data came  from "general  interviews  with the management  on numbers  of men and 
women  employed, policies and  practices as  to  hours of  work, overtime, vacations 
promotions, and  welfare activities,  restrictions based  on  age or  marital status 
kinds  of office  machines used. snd  effect  of  mechsnizstion  on employment  in the 
preceding  i-year  period"  (p  2).  The firms  covered in this survey  are larger 
than  those In a similar 1940  survey  (see below)  and include only  banks  public 
utilities,  insursnce  companies,  investment  houses,  publlshing  tompanies,  snd 
sdvertising  fIrms.  Records for 178 fIrms in  four cities (Chicago  Hartford, New 
York  City  and Philadelphta)  were used  and information  was coded  on- numbers of 
female and  male  office workers, scheduled hours, and personnel relations (whether 
firm  hired  msrrien women, fired  women  if  they married,  had internal  promotion, 
age  restrictions,  pensions,  and  group  insurance).  The  rr,r,ments  of  the 
interviewee  were  also recorded  regarding  the reasons  for various  policies  and 
whether policies  regarding marriage  were  due to the onset  of  the Depression. 
1940 Office Firm Survey:  National  Archives,  Record  Group  #86,  Boxes  496-500. 
See U.S.  Department  of Labor  Women's  Bureau,  "Office Work in  [Nouston,  Los 
Angeles, Kansas  City,  Richmond,  Philsdelphia]:  1940." Bulletins  of the Women's 
Bureau  No.  188-1,2,3,4,5  (Washington,  D.C..  G.P.O.,  1942).  Both firm-  and 
individual-level  records  of this survey  survIve  (see below).  Information  was 
gathered  by the Women's  Bureau  from  pay-roll  records and from inerviews wit? 
personnel  officers  and other  agents  of the  firms.  Firms  of all  sIzes  were 
surveyed,  and include those  in  the sectors listed  for the 1931  survey  plus the 
office  portion of  the manufacturing,  meat  packing, petroleum,  and  transportation 
and communications  industries,  non-profits,  government  agencies,  retail  and 
wholesale  basinesses,  and  small  offices  (e.g.  lawyers).  The surveya  were 
extensive;  for example,  fully one-fourth  of  Philadelphia's  office workers were 
included in the survey  (No. 188-5, p.  2).  Records for 328 firms in  Kansas  City, 
Los Angeles,  end Philadelphia  were  collected  and information was coded  on the 
variables  listed  above  for the 1931 survey plus:  new hires in 1939, personnel 
policies  regarding discrimination  on  the basis of  race and sex (whether the firm 
had policies against the employment  of  women or  men in  certain occupations),  and 
the presence  of  unions.  The interviewees  often noted  whether  the firm  favored 
married  men in hiring,  promotion,  end salaries.  Only firma with more than  9 
female  employeea  and at least  20 total  employees  were coded in Philadelphia 
No  government  agencies were  used in  the sample. 
1940  Office  Worker  Survey:  National  Archives,  Record  Group  #86,  Boxes 472-86. 
See citation  above  for Firm  Records;  also  Goldin  (l9B4a, l986b.  A asmple  of 
724  female  office  workers  and  481  male  office workers was  collected  for 
Philadelphia.  Information  was coded for each  on: age, marital status, educatior. 
(years end  diploma for grade school, high  school, college, and  varioua vocational 
and graduate  programs),  total work experience,  experience  with current  firm, 
Data  Appendix, experience  with  office  work, other  experience,  current earnings,  earnings  when 
worker  began  at the firm, whether worker  had been furloughed, and  whether  work 
with  the current firm  was continuous, 
1957  Hussey  Report: The files  containing these schedules  are in  box #167  of  the 
(as yet  unarchived)  papers of  Gladys Palmer, generously  lent  to  me by  Ann  Miller 
of  the Sociology Department of  the  University of  Pennsylvania.  They  are referred 
to here as the  "Hussey Report,'  after Miriam  Hussey,  who  as Gladys  Palmer's 
assistant,  conducted  the surveys.  See Miriam  Hussey, Personnel  Policies during 
a Period of Shortage  of Youna Women Workers  in Philadelphia  (Philadelphia: 
Industrial Research  Unit,  Wharton School of  Finance and  Commerce. University  of 
Pennsylvania,  1958).  Approximately  40 complete  interviews  exist and cover  a 
range  of Philadelphia  firms and retail  stores  for the period  1956/57.  Many of 
the  same firms  are  included  in the  1931 and 1940  Office  Worker  Surveys  (see 
above>. 
Data Appendix,  -46- 